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Abstract:  
 
Despite progress made in the past few years, challenges remain in addressing inequality and high 
out of pocket payments in Nepal. The policy response to these challenges has been to expand 
the ‘free care’ services program and pilot protection mechanisms against the financial risk of ill 
health. This study was initiated in response to a request to explore sources of fiscal space. The 
study assesses all potential sources of fiscal space including economic growth and mobilization 
from domestic sources, re-prioritizing health within government’s existing expenditure envelope, 
mobilizing resources earmarked for health such as taxation on tobacco and alcohol, increasing 
resources from bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors, and obtaining efficiency gains from improving 
the quality of spending. The study identifies efficiency gains as the main potential source of 
additional fiscal space.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
1. Nepal has seen impressive improvements in health outcomes and has done well 
both in its rate of progress and relative to its income level. Infant mortality has been 
declining over the past five decades from 197 per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 38.6 per 1,000 
live births in 2009. Similarly, maternal mortality has decreased to 380 per 100,000 live births 
in 2008. Life expectancy has been steadily increasing to 67 years in 2009 up from about 38 
years in 1960. These rates of progress are better than those witnessed by neighboring 
countries. For instance, in 1960, Nepal’s infant mortality rate (IMR) was the highest amongst 
its regional comparators. By 2009, Nepal’s IMR had become lower than that of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and Bhutan.  
 
2. But challenges remain in addressing inequality and high out of pocket payments 
(OOP).  Geographic and income-related inequalities in population health outcomes remain 
large and are increasing. For example, not only is the decline in infant mortality not uniform, 
some regions have seen an increase. While the rate has declined nationally over the period 
2001-2006, the mid-western region has seen an increase over the same time period. The 
decline in infant mortality rates for the poorest quintile have lagged behind the decline seen 
in the richest quintile. Out of pocket payments remain high at about 50 percent of total health 
spending. Estimates from 2003/2004 household data indicate a 2.5 percent point increase in 
poverty as a result of high levels of out of pocket health spending. 
 
3. The policy response to these challenges has been to expand free care services and 
pilot protection mechanism against the financial risk of ill health. There is growing 
demand to expand the package and coverage of existing free essential health care to all 
Nepalese, and to introduce new programs such as health insurance, and other similar 
initiatives. Despite relatively high levels of expenditures, there are emerging pressures to 
increase government expenditures on health to meet the above objectives.  
 
4. The natural question is availability of fiscal space to finance initiatives outlined as 
a response. The note assesses all potential sources of fiscal space including economic 
growth and mobilization from domestic sources, re-prioritizing health within government’s 
existing expenditure envelope, mobilizing resources earmarked for health such as taxation on 
tobacco and alcohol, increasing resources from bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors, and 
obtaining efficiency gains from improving the quality of spending so that the most is made out 
of current expenditure.  
 
5. This note identifies efficiency gains as the main potential source of additional fiscal 
space. The analysis presented herein indicates that improvement in health system efficiency 
– that is, getting more value for money – is by far the most plausible option for realizing 
additional fiscal space for health in Nepal. As the note demonstrates, the prospects for 
additional resources for health from all other possible sources – from conducive 
macroeconomic conditions, re-prioritization of health, external resources, and other health-
sector specific sources – is limited in Nepal. On the other hand, there are many indications of 
systemic inefficiencies in the health system of the country and the challenge would be to focus 
on identifying and implementing appropriate interventions to improve the situation and reduce 
waste. The note highlights specific areas, such as those related to provider payments, drug 
procurement mechanisms, and hospital and district grant allocations – where significant 
improvements in obtaining better value for money can be realized. 
ix 
 
6. Nepal has the potential to realize efficiency gains in the health sector in a variety of 
ways. Linking financing to performance is one of the key areas where these gains could be 
realized. Efficiency gains could also be made through refining the design of existing grants 
and incentives so that payments are directly linked to performance. Furthermore, a significant 
amount of resources could be made available by addressing problems of health worker 
absenteeism, drug stock-outs, procurement and distribution of drugs, maintenance of 
equipment, and planning and preparation in procurement of equipment.  
 
7. The highest potential for efficiency gains comes from linking payments to results. 
Clearly designing such a system requires robust monitoring and verification. The Ministry of 
Health could start by explicitly linking grants and transfers and other incentive payments to 
results. These payments are the most immediate candidates to begin with and this experience 
could then be used in expanding to other areas where verification/monitoring capacity is more 
challenging. More can also be saved by addressing a number of other governance related 
issues including staff absenteeism, and equipment procurement and maintenance. 
 
8. The Ministry could explore options of reforming the provider payment system. The 
benefit of this is immediate for hospitals and districts where the grant system is already in 
place. Different types of provider payments have different effects on the hospitals with varying 
level of efficiency. Nepal could start with a per diem system. Per diem systems are ideal for 
implementation as they are simple to administer and less information intensive. The risk is 
that providers quickly learn the system and can start changing behavior in order to maximize 
revenue. The best option would be a mix of per diem and a case based rate.  However, the 
case based payment is complex to administer and requires information that is not readily 
available today. By starting with a per diem system, data that will be necessary might then 
also start to be collected for an eventual move towards a case-based approach. At the same 
time, alternative payment mechanisms to districts and primary care facilities could also be 
explored.  
 
9. Finally, and most importantly, the Ministry needs to rethink its role as a steward of 
the sector. As a steward, it continues to finance but not necessarily provide the health 
services and manage health facilities. In this role, it focuses on the health status of Nepalese, 
on ensuring that they receive financial protection against the risk of ill health, on equity in care, 
as opposed to who provides the health services, and how services are provided (quality, 
efficiency, etc.). Such clarity would assist in developing the sector’s financing strategy, which 
would outline the reform agenda and enhance the government’s strategic thinking in terms of 
efficiency and long-term sustainability of spending.   
 
10. Further analytical work aimed at identifying district level drivers of efficiency is 
planned. Consultations with stakeholders are planned as part of the 
communication/dissemination strategy to better understand the district level findings and to 
seek input to the planned follow-up analyses implied by this study. Why are some districts 
doing better than others, even after controlling for resource inputs? What can explain 
difference such as the 20 years of life expectancy gap between districts? What lessons can 
be learnt from the better-performing districts that could help improve the overall efficiency of 
the health system?   
 
11. At the same time, the findings of the study will be discussed and used to inform the 
planned health financing strategy. One of the motivations of the study was to provide 
x 
background for the development of the health financing strategy. This current study is 
intended to help build the evidence base for formulation of a sound financing strategy.   
xi 
  
xii 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Despite political turmoil and relatively weak economic growth, Nepal has made 
steady and significant progress in its health outcomes over the past several decades. Life 
expectancy has been steadily increasing in the country to almost 67 years in 2009, up from about 
38 years in 1960. The infant mortality rate also declined steadily from 197 per 1,000 live births in 
1960 to 39 per 1,000 live births in 2009. At current trends, and as noted in a recent UN assessment 
report, Nepal is likely to meet both the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for child and 
maternal health by 2015.1  This performance is better than its regional neighbors in terms of trend 
improvements over time with regard to most population health indicators. Moreover, Nepal’s 
population health indicators are much better than what would be expected for a country of its 
income level. 
 
2. Although significant progress is evident, several challenges remain in the health 
sector, especially with regard to inequalities, malnutrition, and out-of-pocket health 
expenditures. Equity is a key challenge. Geographic and income-related inequalities in 
population health outcomes remain large and, in some cases, are rising. Recent survey data 
indicate that almost 50 percent of Nepalese children under five were malnourished. Out-of-pocket 
payments remain high, indicating low levels of risk pooling that are placing many households at 
risk of impoverishment as a result of health shocks. Additionally, concerns remain with regard to 
quality and responsiveness of the health system. 
 
3. As a response to these challenges, there are emerging pressures to expand 
government expenditures on health in the country. There is growing demand to expand the 
package and coverage of existing free essential health care to all Nepalese. Free essential health 
care services (EHCS), initially targeting poor and marginalized groups, have now become free for 
all at district facilities, except for district hospitals (while 40 essential drugs remain free to all). 
Such measures were intended to eliminate financial barriers to accessing health services. As fee 
revenues account for about a quarter of district hospital revenues, any expansion of EHCS will 
require higher compensatory government expenditures on health.  
 
4. Furthermore, there is an ongoing national dialogue on the need to introduce social 
health insurance to address the large amounts of out-of-pocket expenditures. This is 
despite increased access to free health care under EHCS. The demand for a social health 
insurance system is getting the attention of policy makers at various levels of the government 
including the Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Commission. However, with the 
presence of free care for primary care services, the likely services to be insured would be those 
provided beyond the secondary level and those requiring hospitalization. Given the large levels 
of informal employment and poverty in the country, introduction of a social health insurance 
system will likely require significant (if not total) subsidization of premiums by the government. 
Does Nepal have the requisite fiscal resources to expand coverage of free EHCS and introduce 
national health insurance in the near- to medium-term?  
  
1 Government of Nepal/United Nations. 2010.   
 
                                                     
5. Nepal is not an outlier relative to comparator countries when it comes to 
government spending on health. At roughly US$9 per capita in 2009, public spending on health 
in Nepal was about average for its income level and higher than that of regional neighbors such 
as Bangladesh and Pakistan. Government health spending was 9 percent of the budget in the 
same year. In recent years, government expenditures have increased: the government share of 
total health spending went up from about 16 percent in 2000/01 to almost 24 percent in 2005/06.  
 
6. This note assesses public expenditures on health in Nepal from a fiscal space 
perspective and builds on the recently completed public expenditure review. Fiscal space 
for health refers to the ability of a country to increase public spending for health without 
jeopardizing the government’s long-term financial sustainability. Assessment of fiscal space for 
health must be considered within the context of a country’s overall macroeconomic environment, 
and without crowding out necessary and productive expenditure in other sectors. The note builds 
on the work of the recently completed public expenditure review for Nepal which provided an 
assessment of the overall fiscal situation and associated risks in the country as well as detailed 
analyses of the composition and trends of expenditures in the health, education, and social 
protection sectors.2  
 
7. The analysis presented herein indicates that improvement in health system 
efficiency –that is, getting more “value for money” – is by far the best option for realizing 
additional fiscal space for health in Nepal. As the note demonstrates, the prospects for 
additional resources for health from all other possible sources – from conducive macroeconomic 
conditions, re-prioritization of health, external resources, and other health-sector specific sources 
– is limited in Nepal. On the other hand, there are many indications of systemic inefficiencies in 
the health system and the challenge would be to focus on identifying and implementing 
appropriate interventions to improve the situation. The note highlights  specific areas such as 
those related to provider payments, drug procurement mechanisms, and hospital and district grant 
allocations – where significant improvements in obtaining better value for money might be 
realized.         
 
8. The remainder of the note is organized as follows. Section II provides some 
background on the performance of key health system outcomes in Nepal, providing a regional 
and cross-country context. Section III briefly reviews the Nepalese health system and policy 
context. Section IV assesses the potential of additional fiscal space for health from different 
sources. Section V concludes with a brief discussion of the findings and outlines next steps. 
 
 
II. HEALTH SYSTEM OUTCOMES IN NEPAL 
 
 
9. This section summarizes the levels and trends of key health system outcomes in 
Nepal. We follow the WHO framework for assessing health system performance in terms of 
focusing on attainment of population health, responsiveness, equity, and financial protection.3  
 
10. Despite political turmoil and relatively weak economic growth, Nepal has made 
steady and significant progress in health outcomes over the past several decades. Life 
expectancy has been steadily increasing in the country to almost 67 years in 2009, up from about 
2 World Bank. 2010. Nepal Public Expenditure Review, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, South Asia 
Region, World Bank. 
3 WHO. 2000. Health Systems: Improving Performance, World Health Report, Geneva: World Health Organization. 
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38 years in 1960 (Figure 1). The infant mortality rate also declined steadily from 197 per 1,000 
live births in 1960 to 39 per 1,000 live births in 2009 (Figure 1). At current trends, and as noted in 
a recent UN assessment report, Nepal is likely to meet both the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) for child and maternal health by 2015.4  
 
Figure 1. Population health indicators in Nepal, 1960-2009 
 
 
11. Nepal has done better than its regional neighbors and relative to its income in 
trends in improvements in health indicators. For instance, in 1960, Nepal’s infant mortality 
rate was the highest amongst its regional comparators. By 2009, Nepal had overtaken India, 
Pakistan, and Bhutan in terms of its infant mortality rate (Figure 2). Nepal’s improvements in infant 
mortality mirror those of Bangladesh, another star performer in health in the region. In addition, it 
is notable that Nepal’s population health indicators such as under-five and adult mortality are 
much better than expected for a country of its income level (Figure 3).  
  
4 Government of Nepal/United Nations. 2010. Nepal Millennium Development Goals: Progress Report 2010, 
Kathmandu: Government of Nepal and United Nations. 
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Figure 2. Infant mortality rate trends, 1960-2009 
 
 
Figure 3. Mortality rates versus income 
 
 
12. Although significant progress is evident, several challenges remain. Nepal continues 
to face significant challenges in ensuring that health care improvements are distributed equitably 
to all segments of society. Geographic and income-related inequalities in population health 
outcomes remain large and are increasing (Figure 4). For example, not only is the decline not 
uniform, some regions have actually seen an increase in infant mortality over time: while infant 
mortality has declined nationally over the period 2001-2006, the mid-western development region 
actually saw an increase over the same time period. The decline in infant mortality rates for the 
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poorest quintile lagged behind the decline seen in the richest quintile (Figure 4).  In addition, a 
recent survey shows that almost 50 percent of children under five were malnourished in Nepal.5  
 
Figure 4. Infant mortality rate inequality trends, 1996-2006 
 
 
13. Out-of-pocket spending on health – a proxy indicator for financial protection -- 
remains high in Nepal. Recent national health accounts estimates from WHO indicate that the 
OOP spending share in total health expenditure was over 50 percent in 2009. High levels of OOP 
spending evidence low levels of risk pooling and a high potential for impoverishment resulting 
from adverse health shocks. Estimates from analysis of 2003/2004 household data from Nepal 
indicate a 2.5 percent point increase in poverty as a result of high levels of OOP health spending.6 
According to WHO’s 2010 World Health Report, levels of impoverishment related to health shocks 
are low in countries where the OOP share of total health expenditures are in the 15-20 percent 
range or lower.7  
 
14. To summarize, Nepal has made significant progress in attaining key health system 
outcomes but challenges remain in addressing growing inequality and out of pocket 
payments. Trend improvements in key population health indicators have been laudable, 
especially in comparison with its regional neighbors and income comparators. Key challenges 
remain however with regard to equity, financial protection, and malnutrition. The next section 
provides some background information on Nepal’s health system characteristics, financing, and 
policy context. 
  
5 Ministry of Health and Population, New Era, and Macro International Inc. 2007.  
6 RTI International. 2010.  
7 WHO. 2010.  
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III. HEALTH SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS, FINANCING, AND 
POLICY CONTEXT 
 
 
15. Nepal has mixed public-private provision of health services. Survey data indicate 
about 44 percent of health consultations for acute illness occurred at public facilities versus 56 
percent at private facilities. As in other countries in the region, the poor tend to be more likely to 
utilize public facilities (56 percent public versus 44 percent private) as opposed to the rich (40 
percent public versus 60 percent private).8    
 
16. The supply of health service by private hospitals has been increasing at a higher 
rate than that of public hospitals. In the four years between 2004 and 2008, the number of 
private hospitals increased from 69 to 147, representing an increase of more than 131 percent. 
During the same period, the number of public hospitals and primary care centers increased only 
by 8 percent and 19  percent respectively (Figure 5). In terms of hospital beds, this translates to 
an increase of 3,636 beds in the private sector compared to 3,194 in the public sector. On 
average, public hospitals also tend to be larger with 92 beds per hospital than private hospitals 
with 72 beds per hospital.  
 
Figure 5.Number of health care providers and hospital beds, 2004-2008 
 
Source: MOF, 2009; MOHP 2009 and Annual reports 
 
 
17. Total expenditure on health has increased over the past several years in Nepal. Total 
expenditure as well as per capita expenditure has been increasing in real terms since 2000/01. 
Per capita expenditure has increased in real terms by more than by 33 percent between 2000/01 
and 2005/06: from Rs 932 in 2000/01 to Rs 1242 per capita in 2005/06. Government expenditure 
on health has increased from 5 percent of total government expenditure in 2000/01 to close to 7 
percent in 2006/07.   
8 Central Bureau of Statistics (2004), Nepal Living Standards Survey 2003/2004, Kathmandu, Nepal.  
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
0
50
100
150
200
250
2004/05 2005/06 2007/08 2008/09
nu
m
be
r 
of
 b
ed
s
nu
m
be
r 
of
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s
Year
Hospital beds- private Hospital beds- public
Number of private hospitals Number of public hospitals
Primary centers
6 
                                                     
18. Public spending accounts for around 36 percent of total health expenditure, with 
some evidence of a decline over the last decade. The share ranges from 35-44 percent since 
2000/01, with some variation across the years (Table 1).9 About 14 percent of public spending on 
health comes from external development partners, making the government contribution only a 
little more than a fifth of total health expenditure. 
 
Table 1. Key health financing indicators for Nepal, 2001-2009 
Year Health as 
share of 
GDP 
( %) 
Public share 
of 
total health 
spending 
( %) 
Private share 
of 
total health 
spending 
( %) 
Out-of-pocket 
share of private 
spending 
( %) 
External share 
of total health 
spending 
( %) 
2000/01* 5.6 % 40.3 % 59.7 % 59.7 % 24.3 % 
2001/02* 5.9 % 39.1 % 60.9 % 60.8 % 19.6 % 
2002/03* 5.7 % 37.5 % 62.5 % 62.5 % 20.7 % 
2003/04* 5.7 % 38.4 % 61.6 % 61.5 % 21.1 % 
2004/05* 5.6 % 39.5 % 60.5 % 60.5 % 19.7 % 
2005/06* 5.3 % 44.5 % 55.5 % 55.6 % 20.8 % 
2007** 6.0 % 36.0 % 64.0 % 72.8 % 13.1 % 
2008** 6.0 % 37.7 % 62.3 % 72.4 % 11.0 % 
2009** 5.8 % 35.3 % 64.7 % 72.4 % 13.7 % 
Source:  
*NHA, 2009. 
**WHO 
 
19. The contribution of external sources to health spending has steadily declined since 
2000. External sources contributed between 20-21 percent of the total health expenditure in the 
period 2000/01 to 2005/06 but declined to 11 percent in 2008, only to rise to 14 percent in 2009. 
These figures taken together demonstrate two points: (i) government expenditure has increased 
at a much faster rate during this period; and (ii) financing from external sources remains stable or 
has increased only slightly.   
 
20. Private financing dominates health spending in Nepal and is largely out of pocket. 
Total health spending was about 5.7 percent of Nepal’s GDP in 2009. Of this, 64 percent came 
from private sources compared to 36 percent from public sources. In the same year, almost three-
fourths of private financing was OOP (Table 1). Most of the consumption of services from the 
private sector is financed by private spending. With the exception of a few services such as 
institutional delivery, the public mainly finances publicly provided services. Given the utilization 
rate of privately provided health services, it is not surprising that private spending constitutes the 
major part of total health expenditure. 
 
21. As mentioned in the previous section, the share of OOP in total health spending 
remains high. In 2009, almost 50 percent of total health spending was OOP. High levels of OOP 
spending imply low levels of risk pooling and a high potential for impoverishment resulting from 
adverse health shocks.   
9 Some of the recent year data reported in Table 1 are based on WHO’s NHA estimates. It is important to note that 
NHA estimates for government health spending normally differ somewhat from budgetary estimates of health spending 
because the former include health expenditures of other ministries and departments (for example, health spending for 
the military), exclude expenditures on medical education and environmental health, and include other extra-budgetary 
spending (for example, from donors).  
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22. There are new emerging pressures to expand government expenditures on health 
in the country. There is growing demand to expand the package and coverage of existing free 
essential health care to all Nepalese. Free essential health care services (EHCS), initially 
targeting the poor and marginalized groups of society, have now become free for all at district 
facilities, except for district hospitals (while 40 essential drugs remain free to all). Such measures 
were intended to eliminate financial barriers to access health services. Fee revenues account for 
about a quarter of district hospital revenues. Any expansion of EHCS will require higher 
compensatory government expenditures on health.  
 
23. There is also an ongoing national dialogue to introduce social health insurance to 
address the large amounts of out-of-pocket expenditures. With the presence of free care for 
primary care services, services likely to be insured are those provided beyond secondary level 
and those requiring hospitalization. Given the large level of informality and poverty in the country, 
introducing a social health insurance system will likely require significant subsidization of 
premiums by the government.  
 
24. Further discussion is required and consensus needs to be reached on the means 
to finance these policies to attain the national goals. Is there capacity to provide additional 
resources for health to accommodate the above-mentioned objectives currently under 
consideration? What is the capacity of the government to provide additional budgetary resources 
for health? How could fiscal space be created? Clearly, any additional budgetary expansion for 
health should not be at the expense of the sustainability of the government’s financial position. 
This is precisely the question that the next section attempts to answer.  
 
 
IV. ASSESSING FISCAL SPACE FOR HEALTH IN NEPAL 
 
 
25. Fiscal space for health refers to the ability of a country to increase public spending 
for health without jeopardizing the government’s long-term financial sustainability.10 Any 
assessment of fiscal space for health must be considered within the context of the country’s 
overall macroeconomic environment, and without crowding out necessary and productive 
expenditure in other sectors (that is, non-health). The concept of fiscal space can be easily 
understood using the algebra of a government’s intertemporal budget constraint (see Box 1).  
  
10 Heller, P. 2006. “The Prospect of Creating ‘Fiscal Space’ for the Health Sector,” Health Policy and Planning, 21(2): 
75-79. 
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Box 1. Understanding Fiscal Space using the Algebra of a Government’s Intertemporal 
Budget Constraint 
 
The left-hand side of the following represents the uses of budgetary resources whereas the right-
hand side reflects sources of budgetary resources:   
 
Gt + rtBt-1 = Tt + Bt + At + Ot, 
 
where Gt is government non-interest expenditure in time t; rBt is non-discretionary debt interest 
payments; Tt is taxes, fees, and other government revenues, including those arising from 
seigniorage (inflationary finance); Bt is total government borrowing (domestic and foreign net of 
use of deposits); At is grants; and Ot is other sources of funds, such as sale of assets. In other 
terms, the right-hand side represents the aggregate sources of government revenue, and the left-
hand side represents total spending. Fiscal space for health depends not only on the overall 
government budget constraint, but also on the priority assigned to health. Government health 
spending, Ht, is a proportion kt of the overall government budget, or: 
 
Ht = kt Gt. 
 
Whether the priority for health (kt) is a constant or variable parameter is a key policy question. For 
example, if G increases as a result of increases in overall fiscal space, health spending would 
increase by a fixed proportion k if spending priorities remain unchanged. The focus from this 
perspective would be on analyzing increases in G and deriving the implications for H. A focus on 
re-prioritization, on the other hand, would imply finding ways to increase k. Fiscal space can also 
be realized through efficiency gains. Assuming Y represents some measure of government health 
system outputs – for example, effective coverage of key interventions – then getting the most Y 
out of given H is creating effective fiscal space. Interventions aimed at improving the technical 
and allocative efficiency of health spending by, for example, using cost-effectiveness criteria to 
inform resource allocations, reducing leakages in inter-fiscal transfers, or addressing 
absenteeism of health workers are examples of policies that could lead to increases in effective 
fiscal space through efficiency gains. 
 
26. Assessing fiscal space for health implies looking at different sources of sustainable 
financing for increasing public spending on health. Conceptually, building on Tandon and 
Cashin’s (2010) and Heller’s (2006) framework, fiscal space for health can potentially come from 
different sources which can be broadly grouped into the following five categories:11 (i) a conducive 
macro-fiscal environment such as high levels of economic growth and increases in government 
revenues that, in turn, could facilitate increases in public spending for health; (ii) a re-prioritization 
of health within the government budget; (iii) an increase in health sector-specific resources, for 
example, through earmarked taxation; (iv) health sector-specific grants and foreign aid; and (v) 
an increase in the efficiency of existing government health outlays.12 The different pillars of fiscal 
space are explored below within the specific context of Nepal.  
 
The Macro-Fiscal Environment 
 
27. Conducive macro-fiscal conditions are important for fiscal space considerations for 
any sector. These conditions include sustained economic growth, improvements in revenue 
generation, and sustainable levels of deficits and debt. There are several reasons why economic 
11 Ibid.  
12 Tandon, A and C Cashin. 2010.  
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growth is an important factor driving fiscal space. Firstly, even with the public spending on health 
as a share of GDP remaining unchanged, if GDP in a country grows by a certain percent per year 
in real terms then this implies that public spending on health would also increase by the same 
percent per year in real terms (assuming changes in prices of health are not significantly different 
from changes in overall prices over time). Second, as noted first by Newhouse (1977), national 
income is the biggest determinant of public (and private) health spending across countries.13 
Hence, it is critical to assess public spending on health within a broader macroeconomic context. 
 
28. Sustained periods of economic growth and political stability usually result in 
increases in public spending on health. Periods of robust economic growth and macro-fiscal 
stability often result in increases not only in the level but also in the share of the public sector in 
the economy, including for health.14 This is evident in cross-sectional data as shown in Figure 6. 
With increasing national income, public expenditure in health increases both in level and as share 
of GDP. There are several reasons why the government share of health spending tends to 
increase with income. Rising incomes are often associated with a greater demand for, and supply 
of, health care. Richer countries tend to have older populations with more non-communicable 
diseases and a greater need for chronic care, the relative price of health care rises with income 
driving up spending, and the revenue-collection capacities of governments increase with income, 
as do societal preferences for more public financing for health.15 Nepal is not an outlier relative to 
comparator countries when it comes to government spending on health. At roughly US$9 per 
capita in 2009, public spending on health in Nepal was about average for its income level and 
higher than that of regional neighbors such as Bangladesh and Pakistan. 
 
Figure 6. Public spending on health versus income, 2009 
 
 
29. Nepal is poor and lags behind its neighbors at a GDP per capita of about US$427 in 
2009. The country is one the poorest in the South Asia region with more than half the country’s 
population living on less than $1 a day, and more than two-thirds living on less than $2 a day.16 
In addition, Nepal has been a relative laggard in terms of economic growth, averaging a growth 
13 Newhouse, J.P. 1977.  
14 Asia Development Bank. 2006.   
15 Ibid; Empirical evidence suggests the importance of other factors such as the prevalence of corruption, ethno-
linguistic fractionalization, and average education levels in the population as determinants of the extent to which health 
is or is not prioritized by governments. 
16 These are based on the World Bank’s analysis of 2004 data from Nepal. 
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rate of only about 3.6 percent per year (1.3 percent per year in per capita terms) over the time 
period 1960-2008. As a consequence, Nepal has slowly become increasingly left behind in GDP 
per capita terms relative to several of its faster-growing regional neighboring countries such as 
India and Bangladesh (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. GDP per capita in real terms, 1960-2008 
 
 
30. The global financial crisis has adversely impacted Nepal’s economy. The IMF 
estimates GDP growth in the country was about 6.1 percent in 2008. Following the crisis, the 
growth rate declined to 4.9 percent in 2009 and to only about 3.0 percent in 2010.17 Part of the 
slowdown in growth has been a result of a slowing remittance growth, declining exports, growing 
concerns about political instability, and capital flight, all of which have also contributed to lower 
reserves in the country.18 Growth rates are expected to recover this year, projected to rise to 4.0 
percent in 2011, 3.8 percent in 2012, and 4.0 percent by 2013.19 The impact and subsequent 
recovery from the global financial crisis has been delayed for Nepal, especially in contrast to some 
of its regional peers such as India and Sri Lanka which were well on their way to recovery in 2010 
(Figure 8). 
  
17 Nepal’s economic growth rate in 2009 was 1 percent point lower and in 2010 was 2.5% points lower than expected 
when compared with pre-crisis IMF forecasts. 
18 IMF. 2010.   
19 IMF World Economic Outlook projections (IMF numbers are based on calendar year); World Bank estimates that the 
FY2010 growth rate is likely to be 3% followed by 4% in FY2011, 4.2% in FY2012, and 4.4% in FY2013 [see World 
Bank. 2010]. 
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Figure 8. Economic growth rates in Nepal and comparator countries: 
Actual: 1995-2009; Projected: 2010-2015 
 
 
31. Overall government expenditures have increased following the crisis. Government 
expenditures as a share of GDP are projected to increase to 22.4 percent of GDP, up from about 
17.2 percent of GDP in 2009. Recent revenue administration reforms and strong customs and 
VAT collection efforts have led to an increase in the revenue share of GDP, although some of the 
increase has been the result of higher levels of grants (Figure 9). World Bank estimates indicate, 
however, that if the growth of remittances dips below 10 percent then this would adversely impact 
the government’s ability to use revenues for current expenses and principal repayments.20 Public 
debt levels are projected to decline in the near- to medium-term, with the overall government 
deficit projected to remain in the 3 percent of GDP range. Overall, Nepal has had a medium-level 
of exposure to the inimical effects of the financial crisis, with a fairly limited amount of fiscal room 
available in the near- to medium-term for increasing spending on sectors such as health.21  
  
20 World Bank. 2010. 
21 This is consistent with the assessment made by PREM in their analysis of vulnerability of countries to the financial 
crisis: Nepal was classified as a country with a “medium” level of fiscal room based its debt-to-GDP ratio, fiscal deficit, 
current account balance, international reserves, and reversible capital flows; see Cord, L, M Verhoeven, C Blomquist, 
and B Rijkers. 2009.     
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Figure 9. Key fiscal indicators for Nepal 
Actual: 2007-2009; Projected: 2010-2015 
 
 
32. At current growth projections, Nepal could expect additional resources for health 
of about 5.5 billion in 2000 constant Rs – corresponding to about 0.3 percent of GDP – by 
2015 from 2009 levels. Figure 10 shows the relationship between public expenditure on health 
(both in levels and as share of GDP) versus income in Nepal over the period 1995-2009. Although 
there is substantial variation around the trend, increases in national income have been associated 
with rising public expenditure on health both in per capita terms as well as share of GDP. At 
current growth projections – and assuming that public expenditure on health follows the same 
rising trend it has over the period 1995-2009 – Nepal could expect public spending on health to 
be about 2.4 percent of GDP by 2015, an increase of about 0.3 percent of GDP from 2009 
numbers (Table 2). 
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Figure 10. Public spending on health versus income in Nepal, 1995-2009 
 
 
Table 2. Projections of government health spending based on economic growth 
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GDP growth (%) 4.9 
% 
3.0 
% 
4.0 
% 
3.8 
% 
4.0 
% 
4.3 
% 
4.8 
% 
GDP per capita growth (%) 3.8 
% 
2.0 
% 
3.0 
% 
2.8 
% 
3.0 
% 
3.3 
% 
3.8 
% 
GDP (billions of constant 2000 Rs) 591.9 609.6 634.0 657.9 684.6 714.2 748.3 
Government health spending (billions 
constant 2000 Rs) 
12.2 12.7 13.6 14.4 15.3 16.4 17.6 
Government health spending share of 
GDP ( %) 
2.1 
% 
2.1 
% 
2.1 
% 
2.2 
% 
2.2 
% 
2.3 
% 
2.4 
% 
Sources: IMF and Authors’ calculations 
 
33. To summarize, from a macro-fiscal perspective, the prospects of availability of 
additional public resources for health are relatively low. A combination of factors including a 
delayed impact on growth of the financial crisis and a low elasticity of public expenditures on 
health to GDP suggests that – at least in the short- to medium-term and from a macro-fiscal 
perspective – the availability of additional public resources for health is likely to be limited.  
 
Re-Prioritizing Health 
 
34. A second source of fiscal space could arise from re-prioritizing health so as to 
increase its share in the government’s budget. There may be scope for raising health’s share 
of overall government spending in some countries, particularly if the share of health in the 
government budget is lower than comparator countries in the same region or those with similar 
income levels and if certain expenditure categories can be identified that are deemed 
unproductive or unnecessary and could be replaced by additional health spending.  
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35. Re-prioritizing health, however, is unlikely as Nepal is already spending a relatively 
large share of its budget on health. Nepal’s public expenditures on health were about 10.5 
percent of the budget in 2007-2009 (amounting to about 2.1 percent of GDP). This is high relative 
to the regional average of 7.7 percent.22 Compared to other low income countries, expenditures 
on health as a share of the budget in Nepal are about average (Table 3). This would suggest that, 
for Nepal’s public spending on health as share of expenditure to increase, the share of overall 
expenditure in GDP would need to increase as well, the latter being difficult to realize without a 
concomitant rise in revenues.23  
 
Table 3.Health’s share of the government budget and of GDP, 2007-2009 
Country/ 
Region/ 
Classification 
Public expenditure on health  
share of overall  
government expenditure  
(%) 
Public expenditure on  
health share of GDP (%) 
Afghanistan 3.7 % 1.6 % 
Bangladesh 7.8 % 1.1 % 
Bhutan 13.5 % 4.4 % 
India 4.2 % 1.3 % 
Maldives 10.3 % 6.5 % 
Nepal 10.5 % 2.1 % 
Pakistan 3.3 % 0.8 % 
Sri Lanka 8.0 % 1.9 % 
   
South Asia region 7.7 % 2.5 % 
Low income countries 10.1 % 2.5 % 
  Source: WHO 
 
36. In summary, health appears not to be such a low priority in Nepal as to warrant 
arguing for a significant re-prioritization within the budget. Another indication that health is 
not necessarily accorded a low priority in Nepal can be gleaned from looking at how public 
expenditures on health fare relative to revenue-generating capacity relative to other countries. As 
can be seen in Figure 11, for its revenue-generating capacity, shares of overall government 
expenditure allocated to health in Nepal are about average for the region as are public 
expenditures on health as a share of GDP. 
  
22 Although this is low in terms of share of GDP, where the regional average stands at 2.5%. 
23 It is important, however, to note that this does not imply that increase in resource would be used efficiently and as a 
result a rise in health resources necessarily implies better outcomes: Sri Lanka, for instance, devotes a lower share of 
its government’s budget (and GDP) to health, but attains far superior health outcomes. 
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Figure 11. Government revenues and expenditures (overall and health) 
 
 
 
Generating Health Sector Specific Resources 
 
37. New health-specific resources can be an additional source of fiscal space for the 
sector. These policy options might entail the introduction of earmarked taxes and/or some form 
of health insurance premiums in order to increase the resource base for public spending on health. 
Earmarking can involve dedicating an entire tax to fund a particular program (for example, a 
dedicated payroll tax earmarked for social health insurance) or setting aside a fixed portion of a 
particular tax to fund a program (for example, a fixed proportion of general tax revenues allocated 
to the health budget). Earmarked taxes for health sector funding are generally supported by 
political rather than economic arguments, except in the case of “sin taxes” which are designed to 
offset the negative externalities resulting from consumption of goods and/or services (for example, 
cigarette taxes). If health spending is low or unstable, an earmarked tax may be seen as a way 
to insulate health spending from other competing publicly funded activities. From an economic 
perspective, earmarking is often viewed as an imposition of an unnecessary constraint on fiscal 
policy-making, one that reduces flexibility and allocative efficiency.24 In addition, there are 
numerous examples of situations where earmarked funds have been diverted to other activities, 
especially in poor governance settings.25  
 
38. Taxes on consumption of goods that adversely affect health are often earmarked 
for the health sector. As mentioned above, taxes on the consumption of tobacco and alcohol, 
for instance is often considered to be beneficial not only from a public health perspective but also 
from an economic perspective. Thailand, Australia, the US, and Korea, are examples of countries 
that have successfully implemented earmarked taxes on tobacco and used the revenues for 
public health purposes. Even if not earmarked for health, higher taxes can discourage 
24 Savedoff, W. 2004.  
25 Prakongsai, P., W Patcharanarumol, and V Tangcharoensathien. 2008. 
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consumption and reduce illness and accidents (in the case of alcohol), and possibly reduce 
demand for health services, which can reduce the pressure for more resources.  
 
39. Nepal introduced earmarked sin taxes on cigarettes and alcohol in the early 1990s, 
with revenues going to the establishment of the Health Tax Fund. These funds – which financed 
spending to the tune of Rs 214 million in 2005/2006 – are managed by the BP Koirala Cancer 
Hospital and finance cancer treatment as well as community-mobilization activities oriented 
towards promoting health lifestyles.26 In addition, Nepal levies an excise tax and a 10 percent 
value-added tax (VAT) on cigarettes.  
 
40. There may be some room to mobilize additional resources through earmarked taxes 
in Nepal, but the challenge will be ensuring these revenues are allocated to health. Prices 
for tobacco, alcohol, and other narcotics are lower in Nepal than in India. The World Bank’s 
International Comparison Program estimates that the average price index on tobacco, alcohol, 
and narcotics in Nepal was 72 compared to the global average of 100, and lower than 
comparators such as India and Sri Lanka, but higher than Bhutan and Bangladesh (Table 4). The 
challenge in mobilizing additional resources to health through these taxes is not only introducing 
the taxes, but also ensuring that such resources are in fact channeled to health.  
 
Table 4. Price index for tobacco, alcohol, and narcotics 
Country Price level 
index 
tobacco, 
alcohol, 
narcotics 
Bangladesh 44 
Bhutan 60 
India 85 
Maldives 76 
Nepal 72 
Pakistan 62 
Sri Lanka 97 
  
Global 100 
Source: International Comparison Program 
 
41. Such mobilization efforts often require balancing equity consideration with public 
health concerns. Nepal’s tax structure makes tobacco taxation in Nepal less regressive. The 
total tax incidence is estimated to be about 50 percent of the price of tobacco, lower than the 
World Bank’s recommendation that this be between two-thirds and four-fifths of the retail price.27 
One policy option might be to increase taxes only for high-priced and premium brands and use 
the additional resources generated to finance health. This could increase state revenues while 
maintaining the pro-poor nature of the current tax structure on tobacco. From a public health 
perspective however, this could cause some concern for those who would argue that the poorer 
wealth quintiles would be incentivized through lower prices to keep consuming cheap, perhaps 
more damaging tobacco.  
 
26 Prakongsai, P., K Bundhamcharoen, K Tisayatikom, V Tangcharoensathien. 2007. 
27 Karki, YB, KD Pant, and BR Pande. 2003. 
17 
                                                     
42. The potential of mobilizing additional resources through social insurance appears 
to be very limited in Nepal. Many countries expand social health insurance schemes financed 
through legally-mandated premium contributions by employers and workers, sometimes with 
additional government contributions. Expanding social health insurance contributions and 
coverage could play a role in terms of raising public resources for health to the extent that the 
premium-paying proportion of the population is large enough to partially subsidize coverage for 
those that cannot afford to pay. However, given the large extent of the self-employed and casual 
laborer employment – available estimates for 2004 indicate that 73 percent of urban and 95 
percent of rural Nepali’s work in the informal sector – this option remains challenging. 
Furthermore, there is an ongoing discussion among economists on the impact of providing 
premium subsidies to those in the informal sector, who are not necessarily poor, and thereby 
encouraging continued informality in the economy.  
 
Mobilizing External Resources 
 
43. Nepal’s health sector is already quite dependent on external resources. Another way 
to generate fiscal space for health is for governments to utilize external resources in the form of 
foreign aid and grants from international donors. The health sector coordinates external resources 
via a sector-wide approach (SWAP), and Nepal is a member of the International Health 
Partnerships (IHP+) initiative (whereby donors commit to strengthening national health systems 
and to achieve better health results around a single country-led national health strategy). OECD 
official development assistance (ODA) disbursements for health in Nepal over the period 2007-
2009 totaled US$82.8 million from bilateral sources and US$82.3 million from multilateral sources. 
The UK and USA were the largest bilateral donors over this time period, and the World Bank, the 
Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM), and the Global Alliance for Vaccines 
Initiative (GAVI) were the largest among the multilaterals. In total, over the period 2007-2009, 
about 41.2 percent of all donor health disbursements were classified under “health policy and 
administrative management”, 27.1 percent were for “basic health care”, 12.2 percent was for 
“infectious disease control”, with the remainder of resources falling in other categories.28  
 
44. The share of external sources in total health expenditure in Nepal is higher than the 
South Asian regional average, but lower than that of other low income countries. At less 
than 13 percent over the period 2007-2009, this proportion – which has been decreasing from the 
peak of more than 24 percent in 2000 – has remained low since 2007 (Table 1). The average 
proportion of external resources as a share of health spending over 2007-2009 for Nepal was 
lower than the average for low income countries (30.2 percent), although it was higher than the 
South Asia regional average (7.7 percent). Nepal had the third highest external share of total 
health spending in the region, following Afghanistan and Bhutan (Table 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 OECD Credit Reporting System; it is important to note that these data do not include resources from non-OECD 
donors such as India and China. 
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Table 5. External resources as proportion of total health spending, 2007-2009 
Country 
External resources 
 
Share of total health 
spending (%) 
Per capita 
(USD at 
average 
exchange 
rate) 
Afghanistan 18.3 % 8.925 
Bangladesh 7.1 % 1.44 
Bhutan 15.4 % 7.448 
India 1.3 % 0.495 
Maldives 1.3 % 3.972 
Nepal 12.6 % 3.425 
Pakistan 4.0 % 0.851 
Sri Lanka 1.8 % 1.68 
   
South Asia region 7.7 %  
Low income countries 30.2 %  
           Source: WHO 
 
 
45. Given the current level and trend, additional external resources are an unlikely 
source of generating fiscal space for health. While the share of external resources in Nepal is 
higher than the rest of South Asian countries, the trend shows that this share is decreasing. It 
decreased from 24 percent in 2001 to 14 percent in 2010. In per capita terms, development 
assistance for health in Nepal is about US$ 3.4/capita (which is higher than Bangladesh, India, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka and on par with that of Maldives). Nepal has done well in terms of 
leveraging the large global funds earmarked for health (GAVI, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria 
& TB) and in mobilizing bilateral and multilateral DAH through the SWAp. Given the global 
financial crisis, a further increase in DAH may be unlikely. Also, expanding fiscal space through 
external support is not always an attractive option. Donor dependence can come with its own 
negative externalities such as those related to unpredictability and volatility of funds and 
excessive fragmentation, some of which have been mitigated in the Nepalese context via the use 
of pooled funding arrangement under the current SWAP. Other problematic issues with external 
aid include sustainability problems and exposure to contingent liabilities, making any additional 
dependence on external resources a relatively unattractive option for Nepal. Even when there is 
tolerance for these negative consequences, it will be challenging to mobilize additional resources 
from donors beyond the current level without demonstrating efficient use of existing resources. 
 
Efficiency Gains 
 
46. Fiscal space can also be realized by improving the efficiency of existing 
expenditures. Efficiency, broadly defined for any generic production system, implies utilizing and 
allocating inputs so as to attain the maximum possible output(s) for a given level of inputs or 
attaining a given level of output with the minimum inputs (or the least cost). Two components of 
efficiency are generally differentiated: technical efficiency implies attaining the most output from 
a given set of inputs; allocative efficiency implies choosing the optimal set of inputs, given their 
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prices, in order to attain the maximum output at least cost.29 Increases in efficiency increase fiscal 
space indirectly via savings, creating space within the existing envelope, rather than expanding 
the resource envelope through expansion of revenues, external grants, etc. as was discussed 
previously. 
 
47. Measuring efficiency requires defining the appropriate decision-making unit (DMU) 
so as to specify appropriate outputs and inputs. Broader macro-level analyses of efficiency 
of health systems often use country or sub-national administrative units as DMUs. In such cases, 
outputs are often specified in terms population health indicators such as infant mortality rates and 
life expectancy, and at times as a set of intermediate outputs such as immunization rates and 
other health service coverage rates.30 Micro-level analyses of efficiency usually look at case mix-
adjusted unit costs in hospitals and health centers as DMUs, with outputs and input indicators 
reflecting the functions of the specified DMU.  
 
48. Nepal has the potential to realize efficiency gains at regional, district and health 
facility levels.   These include through improving governance, reducing corruption and waste, 
re-allocating resources to priority areas, improving quality, choosing cost-effective interventions, 
and the like. In what follows, regional and district level efficiency analysis is presented to 
demonstrate the varying level of performance across districts thereby the potential of improving 
efficiency within the existing system. Such a benchmarking exercise is useful in providing 
evidence of what can be achieved.  Following this exercise, the various areas where efficiency 
gains might be realized at micro level are examined.  
 
49. There are significant sub-national variations in the attainment of health outcomes 
and outputs in Nepal. For instance, there was a 20 year difference in life expectancy between 
the Western Mountain sub-region (life expectancy around 51) and the Central Hill sub-region (life 
expectancy around 71) in 2006. Interestingly, at least at the sub-regional level, these differences 
in life expectancy are largely unrelated to differences in income (Figure 12). Also, at service 
coverage levels, there are large sub-regional differences in the attainment of key health outputs 
such as skilled birth attendance and DPT3 immunization rates. The differences between regions 
within Nepal are sometimes as large as the differences across countries globally (Figure 13).  
  
29 Hollingsworth, B and S.J. Peacock. 2008. Efficiency Measurement in Health and Health Care, New York: Routledge; 
Subsumed under technical and allocative efficiencies, there may be efficiencies related to scale and scope in the health 
system. 
30 The latter set is, arguably, a more direct measure of the output of a health system. Broader population health 
indicators such as infant mortality rates and life expectancy are often a function of additional factors (for example, 
female education, water and sanitation, nutrition, etc.) which are unrelated to the health system per se.  
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Figure 12. Life expectancy versus income at the sub-regional level, 2006 
 
 
Figure 13. Sub-regional variation in health system outputs in Nepal versus global 
comparators, 2006 
 
 
50.  Similarly, large variations in health outcomes and outputs are evident across 
Nepal’s 75 districts. Pending release of more recent data, exploratory district level analysis was 
done using UNDP’s 2001 district-level estimates on life expectancies, income, and education 
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attainment in Nepal.31 Mugu District in the Mid-Western Mountain sub-region had an estimated 
life expectancy in the country of about 44 years. On the other hand, Bhaktapur District in the 
Central Hill Region had the highest life expectancy of over 71 years. Table 6 lists the top 10 and 
bottom 10 districts based on the estimated life expectancies in 2001.  
 
 
Table 6. Best and worst performing districts based on life expectancy attainment, 
2001 
Best Performing Worst Performing 
District Sub-
Region 
Life 
expectancy 
District Sub-
Region 
Life 
expectancy 
Bhaktapur Central hill 71.3 Mugu Mid-
western 
mountain 
44.1 
Kaski Western hill 70.8 Bajura Far-
western 
mountain 
45.7 
Kathmandu Central hill 69.5 Kalikot Mid-
western 
mountain 
46.7 
Okhaldhunga Eastern hill 69.4 Bajhang Far-
western 
mountain 
49.7 
Kavre Central hill 69.3 Dang Mid-
western 
terai 
50.6 
Tanahu Western hill 68.8 Jumla Mid-
western 
mountain 
50.8 
Rupandehi Western 
terai 
68.3 Jajarkot Mid-
western hill 
51.9 
Udaypur Eastern hill 68.0 Baitadi Far-
western hill 
52.3 
Teharthum Eastern hill 67.8 Dolpa Mid-
western 
mountain 
52.5 
Syangja Western hill 67.7 Rasuwa Central 
mountain 
54.8 
Source: UNDP 
 
 
51. Some districts perform better than others, though this may not be a reflection of the 
efficiency of the health system alone. Are sub-national differences in outcomes related to 
differences in the efficiency of health systems across districts and sub-regions? Attainment of an 
outcome such as life expectancy is a function of many factors such as income, education, 
urbanization, socio-demographics, as well as health system characteristics. As an illustration, 
Figure 13 plots life expectancy versus income across districts and shows the “frontier” of best 
31 UNDP. 2001. Nepal Human Development Report 2001: Poverty Reduction and Governance, Kathmandu: United 
Nations Development Program.  
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performing districts using income as the sole determinant of life expectancy.32 As can be seen, 
after controlling for income, some districts such as Dailekh, Gulmi, Okhaldhunga, and Bhaktapur 
are benchmarks for good performance in attainment of health outcomes whereas Rasuwa, 
Kalikot, Dang, and Mugu are relatively poor performers. Data deficiencies preclude a detailed 
analysis that allows for assessing the extent to which this good performance relative to income is 
a result of health system efficiencies versus a result of other factors. This is a subject for 
subsequent research to better understand the drivers of efficiency. 
 
Figure 14. Data envelopment analysis of life expectancy versus income, 2001 
 
 
52. There are also large differences in efficiency across hospitals. Figure 14 shows the 
Pabon Lasso diagram for all hospitals in the country, excluding tertiary and teaching hospitals.33 
The Lasso diagram plots the bed turnover rate (i.e., the number of cases per bed per year) against 
the bed occupancy rate. A line from the origin passing through any point measures the average 
length of stay at that hospital, with flatter lines representing longer stays. The graph can be 
categorized into four quadrants based on the average turnover and average occupancy rates 
(which were 60.7 and 48.0 percent, respectively in Nepal).34 Hospitals in quadrant I of the graph 
(such as Gorkha) have relatively high turnover and occupancy rates and are deemed more 
efficient. Hospitals in quadrant III such as Dolpa, on the other hand, have low turnover and low 
occupancy rates and appear to be relatively inefficient. The overall occupancy rate is also 
relatively low in Nepal, although this may be reflective of poor data quality. Against this indicator, 
the ten best and worst performing hospitals are reported in Table 7.  
  
32 The estimation of the “frontier” involves using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method; See Coelli, T, DS 
Prasada Rao, CJ O’Donnell, and GE Battese. 1998. An Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, New York: 
Springer.  
33 Lasso, P. 1986. “Evaluating Hospital Performance through Simultaneous Application of Several Indicators,” Bulletin 
of the Pan American Health Organization, 20(4): 341-357. 
34 By way of contrast, the hospital occupancy rate in OECD countries averages around 80 percent. 
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Figure 15. Variations in hospital efficiency across districts in Nepal, 2008 
 
 
Table 7. Best and worst performing hospitals, 2008 
Best Performing Worst Performing 
Hospital District Sub-
Region 
Hsopital District Sub-
Region 
Argakhanchi      Arghakhanchi Western hill Dolpa  Dolpa Mid-
western 
mountain 
Gorkha Gorkha Western hill Manang Manang Western 
mountain 
Sunsari Sunsari Eastern 
terai 
Baitadi Baitadi Far-
western hill 
Rukum Rukum Mid-
western hill 
Rasua Rasua Central 
mountain 
Sindhupalchowk Sindhupalchowk Central 
mountain 
Solukhumbu Solukhumbu Eastern 
mountain 
Sankhuwasabha Sankhuwasabha Eastern 
mountain 
Mugu Mugu Mid-
western 
mountain 
Bhojpur Bhojpur Eastern hill Mustang Mustang Mid-
western 
mountain 
Udaypur Udaypur Eastern hill Humla Humla Mid-
western 
mountain 
Trishuli Nuwakot Central hill Rangeli Morang Eastern 
terai 
Pyuthan Pyuthan Mid-
western hill 
Rolpa Rolpa Mid-
western hill 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
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53. The variation in district performance needs further analysis to identify the 
determinants of efficiency. Clearly districts vary in performance. These variations are observed 
in the coverage of immunization and skilled birth attendance, in life expectancy), and in hospital 
performance.  Some are doing quite well while other are performing poorly. Ideally one would like 
to see the poor performing districts catch up to the best performing. This requires understanding 
the driving force behind the performance of the high performers. A carefully designed case study 
of a couple of best and poor performing districts could help to understand the dynamics better. 
Such understanding is essential for any effort to improve performance at district level. 
 
54. Such work will involve a more detailed study of well- performing and poorly 
performing districts and be informed by extensive consultations with stakeholders. The 
above analysis provides a general sense that there are differences in the performance of districts 
across Nepal. But with the available data, it is hard to pin point the drivers of efficiency in these 
districts.  A more detail analysis would combine a quantitative study complemented with a 
qualitative analysis to provide a deeper understanding of the epidemiological, demographic, 
cultural, motivational and other district level idiosyncratic factors driving performance.  The 
dissemination of the results of the current study can start off the consultation process for a 
potential case study of districts.  
 
55. There are additional indications of systemic micro-level inefficiencies in the health 
sector. For instance, anecdotal evidence from limited facility surveys suggests that inefficiency 
is a major issue at facility level. Absenteeism is a concern, with 13 percent of facilities reporting 
being understaffed due to staff absenteeism; unfilled positions range between 39 percent among 
doctors to 24 percent among nurses. The problem is more severe in hospitals than in health 
posts (HP) and sub health posts (SHP). About 13-21 percent of the positions in hospitals remain 
unfilled while 8-12 percent of the positions in HP and SHPs remain unfilled. There is also some 
evidence of sub-optimal spending.35 For instance, drug stock-outs lasting more than a week are 
common in HPs and SHPs; and it takes more than a month for drugs to reach these facilities 
from district headquarters. Finally, efficiency of spending and the system of accountability might 
be improved significantly by strengthening the link between performance and financing. Linking 
financing to performance can be done both at facility as well as district levels. 
 
56. In what follows, the above-mentioned sources of inefficiencies in Nepal’s health 
system are explored separately and in more detail, and corrective policy interventions are 
suggested. Whenever the data allows, crude indicators of the magnitude of gains from efficiency 
are also presented. 
 
57. Linking Payments to Performance: There are a number of justifications as to why 
linking financing to performance can help to improve efficiency thereby effectively 
creating fiscal space. The most obvious is the fact that by demonstrating results one could crowd 
in finances. The Ministry would have a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis the Ministry of 
finance in budget negotiations if it could show the results achieved. By its nature, linking payments 
to results promotes transparency and accountability in the system thereby reducing leakages. 
Finally, by conditioning payment to results, one can directly address the concerns about inequality 
35The idea is related to fixed costs. That costs such as infrastructure and salaries are (semi) fixed costs that vary 
marginally with the workload of the facility. And hence when the corresponding budget for inputs such as drugs is not 
provided, infrastructure and health workers are underutilized. The effect would be compounded when the quality 
elasticity of demand is high. 
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in access to and utilization of health services. For example, payments could be directly linked to 
the number of proportion of poor/ marginalized/excluded groups serviced in the facility.  
 
58. Provider Payments: A gradual change in the provider payment system could be 
utilized to incentivize hospitals to improve efficiency. Different types of provider payments 
have different effects on the hospitals with varying level of efficiency. Changing the payment from 
the current to a per diem system, for instance, would incentivize increases in bed occupancy rate. 
This is desirable as the bed occupancy rate is rather low in most of these hospitals. It is important 
to understand that the change to a per diem system will incentivize increases in average length 
of stay (ALOS) because the cost of inputs per day is higher in early days of hospital stay and 
decreases with stay. The drive to reduce cost by the hospital means that hospitals tend to increase 
ALOS more than they increase admission. However, the fact that most of these hospitals have 
low bed occupancy as well as low ALOS may make per diem an appropriate initial option. The 
per diem system has an added advantage of administratively requiring less information to 
implement. 
 
59. Given the current performance of hospitals, Nepal could start with a per diem 
system with an eventual move to a case-based approach. A per diem system is ideal for 
implementation as it is simple to administer and is less information intensive. The risk is that 
providers quickly learn the system and can start changing behavior in order to maximize 
revenues. The best option may be a mix of per diem and case based rate which will take 
advantage of the per diem system while at the same time addresses its downside, by correcting 
for expected length of stay based upon the type of illness being treated. However, a case-based 
payment system is complex to administer and requires information that is not readily available 
today. By starting with per diem system, data that are necessary to design a case-based rate can 
be collected for eventual move towards case-based approach.36  
 
60. Grants to Hospitals and Districts: Refining the current practice of providing grants to 
hospitals would enable the government make the most out of existing expenditures. 
Instead of unconditional grants, hospitals could be provided payments that encourage better 
performance. Such payment could be in the form of lump sum so that the hospital retains the 
flexibility of spending without the need to report on budget lines. However, the payment can be 
based on performance so that the hospital is incentivized to do better. There are extensive 
international experiences in reforming provider payments systems that Nepal can learn from.37 
Moreover, such practices can improve the transparency of the budget process and allocation 
which otherwise remains highly compromised with further expansion of the use of making grants 
to facilities/providers within the budget. 
 
61. Consolidating Incentive Programs: Consolidating and improving the implementation 
of existing incentive programs would also improve the efficiency of spending. Designing 
appropriate payment mechanism is critical to get the best value for money. For instance, the safe 
motherhood delivery/maternity incentive pays (or reimburses) for each cesarean related services. 
Such fee for service payment mechanisms are known to encourage over supply of the cesarean 
related services, not to mention compromise in quality of services. There are other programs that 
face similar challenges. The Ministry has, on a number of occasions, raised this concern and 
others related to absence of effective monitoring. What is missing is strategic thinking to begin 
treating such programs as services that the Ministry of Health and Population is purchasing. 
36 See Langenbrunner J.C., C. Cashin, and S O’Dougherty. 2009.  
37 Cashin, C., J. Koettl, and P. Schnieder. 2010. 
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Strategic purchasing would involve medical audits where such over provision and quality issues 
could come to light. 
 
62. Provide users the choice among health facilities by letting the money follow the 
user. Putting Free Care in the Hands of the Users: There is some evidence that a number of 
facilities implementing free care are unable to provide the full range of services and drugs they 
are supposed to provide. The free care program entitles users the right to receive services with 
no payment. The Ministry allocates budget to participating facilities to enable them provide 
services free of charge. In effect, this means that it is up to providers to provide the services for 
free with little consequences for failing to do so.   The alternative to allocating budgets to facilities 
to provide services is to put the budgetary decision on the hands of users by allowing them to 
choose among health facilities. That is – instead of providing money to facilities – money be given 
to potential users (in the form of explicit entitlements) so that they can make payment to facilities 
when using services. This way, users will have the right to choose which facility to go to and pay 
only for services provided and facilities will have incentives to attract users. For instance, when 
facilities are out of drugs, they could lose revenues if users choose to go elsewhere.  
 
63. Such practices can create healthy competition among health facilities. When money 
follows the user, health facilities will compete to attract users. For this process to work, health 
facilities should be given a certain level autonomy such as the ability to retain resources mobilized 
through provision of services. It is not clear how well the current system of free care program is 
serving the population. However, it is clear that facilities have little to gain or lose by serving more 
or less users as a result of the free care policy. But providing users the power to express their 
satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the way they use these facilities would improve efficiency and 
accountability in service delivery.   
 
64. Absenteeism of Health Workers: Gains from addressing health worker absenteeism 
alone would cover more than the cost of one year’s worth of family planning commodities 
in Nepal. Health worker absenteeism costs the sector significantly: on average, less than 75 
percent of all doctors’ positions in health facilities throughout the country are filled. This is a 
conservative estimate and varies across the regions: from 61 percent in the Mid-Western Region 
to 86 percent in the Central Region.38 What is alarming is the trend appears to be increasing. A 
recent survey by the Research Triangle Institute (RTI) shows that the percentage of actually filled 
sanctioned positions at district hospitals has actually decreased.39  
 
65. Salaries and benefits constitute about 25 percent of government expenditure. If doctors’ 
salaries and benefit account for a quarter of total salaries and benefits, the gain that could be 
obtained through addressing absenteeism of doctors alone would be equivalent to increasing the 
government budget for health by at least 1.6 percent.   
 
66. Drug Stock-Outs and Expiry: Another area where the Ministry could gain efficiency is in 
drugs procurement, storage, and distribution. There is anecdotal evidence showing that drugs 
expire at district medical stores while a number of health facilities in the district run out of drugs.40 
More recently, a report by the auditor general identified drug stock-out and drug expiry as major 
performance issues. There are at least two reasons for this: (i) the drug distribution system below 
the district level is performing poorly; and (ii) the remaining shelf life of procured drugs is short.   
38 Surveys show that between 30-40% of doctors/health workers are absent in their post (the Nick Simons Institute 
estimates 30% of doctors in district hospitals were absent; MOPH accounts estimate that 40% of the ‘filled’ posts are 
unmanned).  
39 RTI. 2010. 
40 Ibid. 
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67. A significant amount of resources can be saved by addressing the above two 
constraints related to drugs. The current trend of procuring drugs for multiple years with 
different delivery schedules would help exploit the economies of scale in purchasing and reduces 
the administrative cost of procuring (tendering, evaluating, etc.) drugs every year. While this is a 
laudable practice, it would not address the lack of effective distribution from district medical stores 
to health facilities. The Ministry needs to start looking at alternative ways of distribution including 
partnering with the private sector through performance based contracts for effective distribution. 
Drugs and medical supplies constitute about 20 percent of government expenditures. Making the 
investment is worth the cost in order to ensure such a significant amount of the budget is used 
effectively.  
 
68. Drug Price: Moving away from local procurement could result in significant savings as 
prices of local procurement on average are a staggering 300 percent higher than central 
procurement.41 The prices of drugs procured locally vary significantly. Part of this difference is 
due to cost of transportation, which differs significantly among districts. But the major part of the 
price difference is due to inaccurate cost estimates and the fact that such estimates are 
announced in bid documents.42 In about 90 percent of the cases reviewed, the winning bid prices 
were equal to the estimated price, which would not be the case if competition drove down the 
price. Savings could have been obtained by both changing this approach, and by splitting items 
in strategic slices rather than putting everything into a single package. It was estimated that, in 
one of the districts, splitting tenders could have saved an equivalent of at least 18 percent of 
value.43 
 
69. Equipment Out of Use: A recently completed survey of equipment found that there are a 
number of new medical equipment lying unused in hospitals stores. In some cases, this 
equipment are not in use because of absence of qualified staff to operate them; in other instances, 
they are not in use because they are not installed, yet in another instance the building meant to 
house them is not appropriate, or that the necessarily consumables or related supplements are 
missing. In almost all cases, a significant improvement could be made through a more proper 
needs assessment, preparation, and planning in procurement and use. For instance, requests 
from a district for particular equipment could be assessed in relation to the preparation of the 
facility to house and install the equipment, the availability/need of trained staff, etc. Similarly, 
procurement could ensure that all supplementary parts, consumables, and the necessary 
installation and training are all taken care of through the procurement process.  
 
70. Equipment Maintenance: Most of the equipment that lies unused because it need repair 
is of high value and large sums of money could potentially be saved through proper planning in 
procurement and use. The current effort supported by KFW that partners with the private sector 
to bring in maintenance capacity to the Ministry is an encouraging development. Such a 
partnership not only ensures such a specialized activity as maintenance will be done by qualified 
firm, but also strengthens the Ministry’s capacity. 
 
 
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
71. Despite relatively high levels of expenditures, there are emerging pressures to 
increase government expenditures on health in Nepal. For instance, there is growing demand 
41 Swiss Center for International Health (2009). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Stoermer, M., S.S. Sharma, C Napierala, and P.R. Silwal. 2008. 
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to expand the package of services under the free care program and expand the coverage of the 
free essential health care program to all Nepalese; to introduce new programs such as health 
insurance, and for other similar initiatives which will all add pressure on the already-stretched 
government financing envelope.  
 
72. The challenge is finding ways to expand the fiscal space to accommodate emerging 
pressures for increase in expenditures. This note has assessed public expenditures on health 
in Nepal from a fiscal space perspective. Table 8 summarizes the prospects of fiscal space for 
health from five major pillars: conducive macroeconomic conditions, re-prioritization of health in 
the budget, health-sector specific sources, grants and foreign aid, and efficiency gains. The best 
options for fiscal space for health for Nepal are likely to be from an improvement in the efficiency 
of existing resources in the health sector 
 
73. The analysis presented herein indicates that improvement in health system 
efficiency – that is, getting more value for money – is by far the best option for realizing 
additional fiscal space for health in Nepal. As the note demonstrates, the prospects for 
additional resources for health from all other possible sources – from conducive macroeconomic 
conditions, re-prioritization of health, external resources, and other health-sector specific sources 
– is limited in Nepal (Table 8 summarizes the findings). On the other hand, as the note discusses, 
there are many indications of systemic inefficiencies in the health system of the country and the 
challenge would be to focus on identifying and implementing appropriate interventions to improve 
the situation. The note highlights some specific areas – such as those related to provider 
payments, drug procurement mechanisms, and hospital and district grant allocations – where 
significant improvements in obtaining better value for money might be realized.         
 
74. Nepal has the potential to realize efficiency gains in the health sector in a variety of 
ways. Linking financing to performance is one of the key areas where these gains could be 
realized. Efficiency gains could also be made through refining the design of existing grants and 
incentives so that payments are directly linked to performance. Furthermore, significant resources 
could be made available by addressing the problems of health worker absenteeism, drug stock-
outs, procurement and distribution of drugs, maintenance of equipment, and planning and 
preparation in procurement of equipment.  
 
75. The highest potential for efficiency gains may come from linking payments to 
results. Clearly designing such a system requires a robust monitoring and verification. The 
Ministry could start by explicitly linking grants and transfers and other incentive payments to 
results. These payments are the most immediate candidates to begin with and experience from 
this can be used in scaling up to other areas where verification/monitoring capacity is more 
challenging. More can also be saved by addressing a number of other governance related issues 
including staff absenteeism, equipment procurement and maintenance. 
  
76. The Ministry could explore reforming the provider payment system. The benefit of 
this is immediate for hospitals and districts where the grant system is already in place. Different 
types of provider payments have different effects on the hospitals with varying level of efficiency. 
Nepal could start with a per diem system, and move gradually towards a combined system as 
described in this note. At the same time, alternative payment mechanisms to districts and primary 
care facilities could also be explored. One possibility is capitation payments with adjustment for 
differences in costs of production. Such a system, however, requires a reliable mechanism of 
verifying enrollment upon which the capitation payment is based. There are examples within the 
region where enrollment IDs were produced using a technology that can also be applied for other 
purposes.  
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77. Finally, and most importantly, the Ministry needs to rethink its role as a steward of 
the sector. As a steward, it continues to finance but not necessarily provide the health services 
and manage health facilities. It focuses on the health status of Nepalese; ensuring that they 
receive financial protection against the risk of impoverishment due to ill health; on equity in care, 
as opposed to who provided the health services; and on how services are provided (considering 
quality, efficiency, etc.). Such clarity would assist in developing the sector’s financing strategy.  
Such a financing strategy would outline the reform agenda and enhance the government’s 
strategic thinking in terms of efficiency and the long-term sustainability of spending.   
 
 
Table 8. Fiscal space for health at a glance for Nepal 
Fiscal Space 
Source 
Key Information Prospects for 
Fiscal Space 
Macroeconomic 
conditions 
Growth slowdown as a result of 
declining remittances, declining 
exports, and capital flight; 
Overall deficit expected to 
increase. 
Poor 
Re-prioritization 
of health in the 
government 
budget 
Health spending as share of 
budget is relatively high; No 
strong evidence that health is 
accorded a low priority. 
Poor 
Health sector-
specific resources 
Additional “sin” taxes may be 
utilized to generate fiscal space 
earmarked for health. 
Medium/Poor 
Health sector-
specific grants 
and foreign aid 
External dependence already 
high in health sector. 
Poor 
Efficiency gains Evidence of significant efficiency 
differentials within country 
suggests the importance of this 
option. 
Good 
 
 
78. Next Steps and follow on work: Consultations with stakeholders will be held as part of 
the communication and dissemination strategy to better understand the findings of the study, and 
to seek inputs for the follow-up analyses required.  Such work, to be supported the Bank and 
other partners, will further explore the potential efficiency gains with a focus on identifying the 
drivers of inequalities in performance across districts. Such work will involve a case study of well- 
performing and poorly performing districts and will be informed by extensive consultations with 
stakeholders. A more detail analysis would combine a quantitative study complemented with a 
qualitative analysis to provide a deeper understanding of the cultural, motivational and other 
district level idiosyncratic factors driving performance.  The dissemination of the results of the 
current study can start off the consultation process for a potential case study of districts.  
 
79. At the same time, the findings of the study will be discussed during the workshop 
as an input to the planned health financing strategy. One of the motivations of this study was 
to provide background for the development of the health financing strategy. Broad consultations 
were conducted before and after the Maldives High-Level Forum on Health Care Financing of 
30 
June 2010 to identify key areas where analytical work were required to build the evidence base 
for formulation of a sound financing strategy. This current study is one of the key analytical pieces 
identified through this process and we hope it will support Nepal in its efforts to improve health, 
nutrition and population outcomes.  
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Despite progress made in the past few years, challenges remain in addressing inequality and high out of 
pocket payments in Nepal. The policy response to these challenges has been to expand the ‘free care’ 
services program and pilot protection mechanisms against the financial risk of ill health. This study was 
initiated in response to a request to explore sources of fiscal space. The study assesses all potential 
sources of fiscal space including economic growth and mobilization from domestic sources, re-prioritizing 
health within government’s existing expenditure envelope, mobilizing resources earmarked for health 
such as taxation on tobacco and alcohol, increasing resources from bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors, 
and obtaining efficiency gains from improving the quality of spending. The study identifies efficiency gains 
as the main potential source of additional fiscal space.   
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